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FAITH IN THE LAW—THE ROLE OF LEGAL 
ARRANGEMENTS IN RELIGION-BASED 
CONFLICTS INVOLVING MINORITIES 
Ofrit Liviatan* 
Abstract: This Article examines the conflict-management role conferred 
upon the law within Western liberal democracies in the context of cultural 
tensions involving religious minorities. The Article finds that a threatened 
hegemonic Christian identity and secular illiberal sentiments disguised in 
liberal narratives often motivated legislative and judicial actions curtailing 
the freedom of religious minorities in leading liberal democracies. Based 
on these findings, this Article challenges the shortcomings of existing lib-
eral scholarship to account for the potential bias presented in the liberal 
preference to facilitate cultural conflicts through legal means. Yet, the Ar-
ticle suggests that law’s limitations as a neutral vehicle in conflict resolu-
tion does not necessarily counteract its ability to manage conflicts. The 
continued attractiveness of law as the principal conflict-resolution device 
in liberal democracies springs from its political nature, namely the recog-
nition that shifts in political power could translate into legal change. 
Introduction 
 Neutrality among competing notions of the good life has been lib-
eralism’s formula for peaceful social coexistence.1 Liberal constitution-
alists conferred the implementation of this formula on the law under 
the assumption that constitutional frameworks and other human rights 
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1 See Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality 113, 127 (Stuart 
Hampshire ed., 1970); see also John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism 69–70 (2000); Charles 
Taylor, Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in Liberalism and the Moral Life 
159, 164 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). The search for neutrality derives from liberalism’s 
notion of “justice,” an idea that has been articulated with slight variations by different liberal 
thinkers, beginning with Kant. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Jus-
tice 34–35 (John Ladd trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965). Its prominent contemporary 
representative is John Rawls. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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instruments would regulate the democratic process and ensure its im-
partiality among competing values.2 
 This Article explores the law’s conflict-management role in the 
context of religion-based controversies within liberal democracies in-
volving practices of religious minorities. Minorities’ religious claims 
pose a difficult challenge to liberal political thought.3 Liberalism seeks 
to guarantee religious liberty and protect minorities who are vulnerable 
to a majority’s encroachment on their rights. Nevertheless, minorities’ 
religious claims are frequently at odds with the values and traditions of 
the dominant culture in Western democracies. Thus, in an increasingly 
diversifying world, Western policy-makers and judges must grapple with 
the task of weighing religious freedom claims—possibly involving patri-
archal or otherwise discriminatory practices—against competing claims 
invoking comparable liberal ideals such as liberty, equality, and auton-
omy.4 
 Western democracies could hardly be regarded as a single unit. 
With different histories, Western democracies diverge in key variables 
including demography, religious heritages, and the legal arrangements 
regulating the relationship between religion and state. Nevertheless, in 
an attempt to address growing socio-cultural diversity, Western democ-
racies have converged toward a common pluralistic approach on coex-
istence, cultivating the perception that they offer a hospitable legal en-
vironment for religious minorities.5 
 As illustrated in what follows, discrepancies exist between the de-
jure liberal approach of maintaining neutrality toward competing 
worldviews by way of rights protection, and its de-facto legal application 
in the context of religious minorities. The surveyed legislative and judi-
                                                                                                                      
2 See, e.g., Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality 93–94 (1995); Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire 90–91 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 147–49 (1977); 
Walter F. Murphy, Constitutional Democracy 6–7(2007); Edward Schneier, Crafting 
Constitutional Democracies 3 (2006); Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy 6–7 
(2007). 
3 See Renáta Uitz, Freedom of Religion in European Constitutional and Inter-
national Case Law 169 (2007); Willy Foutré, Belgium’s Anti-Sect War, 12 Soc. Just. Res. 
277, 377–78 (1999); Danièle Hervieu-Léger, France’s Obsession with the “Sectarian Threat,” in 
New Religious Movements in the 21st Century 49, 50 (Phillip Charles Lucas & Tho-
mas Robbins eds., 2004). 
4 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 56–57; Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction to Liberalism 
and the Moral Life, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
5 See Benjamin R. Barber, Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent, in Liberalism and the 
Moral Life, supra note 1, at 55 (“Western liberal states are in fact all liberal democracies, 
combining principles of individual liberty with principles of collective self-government and 
egalitarianism.”). 
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cial actions in Europe and the United States suggest that minorities’ 
religious liberty has been legally curtailed while dressed in the guise of 
liberal discourse, often stemming from threatened hegemonic Chris-
tian identity and secular illiberal sentiments. Based on these findings, 
this Article scrutinizes the promotion of law in current liberal thought 
as the primary device for defusing cultural tensions. 
 Part I of the Article lays out the theoretical approaches establish-
ing the role of legal institutions as primary vehicles in advancing liberal 
values.6 Part II surveys clashes between religious minority claims and 
competing rights and interests. This survey suggests that minorities’ 
religious freedom within Western democracies has been repeatedly re-
stricted using neutral liberal narratives that mask illiberal motivations.7 
Part III evaluates the practicality in assigning the role of facilitating co-
existence to the law.8 The Article concludes that the possibility of ma-
nipulating legal arrangements does not necessarily counteract law’s 
conflict-management character.9 The political character of the law— 
namely, the intrinsic possibility to change unfavorable legal arrange-
ments by way of political shifts—contributes to preserving law’s author-
ity as a mechanism of dispute resolution. 
I. Theoretical Approaches on the Role of Law in  
Advancing Liberal Ideals 
 The perpetual quest within Western political thought to resolve 
social and cultural tensions prompted the contemporary ascendancy of 
the liberal project.10 Liberalism’s basic premise is that there is no single 
best way to live one’s life because different people hold differing ideas 
on the correct ordering of values.11 As such, peaceful coexistence in 
multicultural societies necessitates the protection of personal liberty to 
all and a governmental commitment to cultural neutrality.12 In modern 
                                                                                                                      
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 196-211. 
10 See Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 4 (“[C]urrent political conditions have had a num-
ber of consequences . . . [including] that liberalism has emerged as the political theory 
whose resources are most called upon . . . .”); see also Gray, supra note 1, at 3 (“[L]iberal 
regimes are often viewed as solutions to a modern problem of pluralism.”); Bhiku Parekh, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism 11 (2000) (“Liberalism is rightly assumed to be the most 
hospitable of all political doctrines to cultural diversity.”). 
11 See Judith N. Shklar, Liberalism of Fear, in Liberalism and the Moral Life, supra 
note 1, at 21. 
12 See sources cited supra note 1. 
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Western democracies these ideas have been channeled through legal 
instruments institutionalizing constitutional guarantees for fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms.13 These constitutional entrenchments are re-
garded as facilitating pluralism by protecting minorities from majority 
encroachment and ensuring that social and cultural conflicts are neu-
trally managed. 14 
 Nonetheless, liberalism does not envision rights as absolute con-
cepts, legitimizing their limitation when they conflict with other fun-
damental rights or when important competing interests are at stake. As 
Berlin famously noted, “[t]he world that we encounter in ordinary ex-
perience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equal-
ly ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of 
which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.”15 Because consti-
tutions are often deliberately abstract, in many Western democracies 
courts have become the primary institutions determining the ultimate 
result of constitutional conflicts.16 This process of judicial interpreta-
tion gave rise to ample scholarly debate as liberal thinkers sought to 
discern neutral principles for the limitations of rights.17 
 The “Law as Integrity” jurisprudential position, developed in the 
scholarship of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, advances the utilization 
of moral criteria in legal interpretation. According to this view, the 
process of judicial review necessarily considers values and principles that 
act as moral constraints on judges, leading them to the true meaning of 
the law.18 This principle-driven approach has been sharply criticized by 
                                                                                                                      
 
13 Schneier, supra note 2, at 4. 
14 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 9–10; Schneier, supra note 2, at 73–75; Sunstein, supra 
note 2, at 6–7. For a critical assessment of the global trend of constitutionalism, see gener-
ally Ofrit Liviatan, The Impact of Alternative Constitutional Regimes on Religious Freedom in Can-
ada and England, 32 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 45 (2009). 
15 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 168 (1970). 
16 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 466. But see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow 
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 35 (2d ed. 2008). See generally Robert 
Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 572 (2005) 
(discussing the role of balancing in courts’ interpretation of constitutional rights). 
17 See Barry, supra note 2, at 3–4; Murphy, supra note 2, at 6–8, 471–72. 
18 See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 2 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, Free-
dom’s Law 81–82 (1996); Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 2, at 255–58; Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 2, at 81. According to Dworkin, principles like jus-
tice, equality, political integrity, and the respect for individual rights—often enshrined in 
constitutional prescriptions—provide the moral foundation for legal judgment and lead 
judges toward the correct interpretation of the law even in the hardest of cases. Similarly, 
Rawls argued: 
[T]he Justices . . . must appeal to the political values they think belong to the 
most reasonable understanding of the public conception and its political val-
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the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) Movement.19 CLS scholars dismiss the 
rational foundation of legal reasoning as masking an overtly biased fa-
cilitation of freedoms that reinforces the hegemonic interests and ide-
ologies in society.20 Nonetheless, the CLS Movement itself has been ac-
cused of nihilistic attitudes and circular legal deconstructions, stopping 
short of offering an alternative political vision for a just society.21 
 Legal Pragmatism attempted to fill this ideological liberal gap by 
forsaking any grand theory of constitutional adjudication.22 This ap-
proach identified the goal of adjudication in “[helping] society cope 
with its problems” by applying a flexible “whatever works” criterion as 
opposed to searching for the “truth, natural law, or some other high-
level abstract validating principle.”23 As such, the pragmatist’s adjudica-
                                                                                                                      
 
ues of justice and public reason. These are values that they believe in good 
faith, as the duty of civility, requires that all citizens as reasonable and ration-
ale might reasonably be expected to endorse. 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 236 (1993). 
19 Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 73 (1987). 
20 See id. at 62–63; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siècle 2 
(1997); Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 36 (1986); James Boyle, 
The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 703–
04 (1985); Allen C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scho-
lars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 208–09 (1984); Da-
vid Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in The Politics of Law 11, 16–17 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Mark 
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 623, 645–46 (1984). 
21 See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 84 (2003); Raymond 
A. Belliotti, Is Law a Sham?, 48 Phil. & Phenomenological Res. 25, 38–40 (1987); Hut-
chinson & Monahan, supra note 20, at 213, 227, 238–39; Theodore J. St. Antoine, Book 
Review, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 142, 142 (1989) (reviewing Kelman, supra note 19). 
22 See Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Moral and Legal Theory 240–42 
(1999); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 50–51; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Po-
litical Conflict 15–16 (1996); Daniel Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 
Minn. L. Rev. 1331, 1331–32 (1988); Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism 
for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 163, 167–69; Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other 
Side, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev 1569, 1589–95 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 
41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 805–06 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1699, 1700–01 (1990). See generally John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 
(1927); Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle (1999); Richard Rorty, Conse-
quences of Pragmatism (1982); W. Eskridge & Phillip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990). 
23 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism vs. Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 Stan. L. 
Rev. 737, 738 (2002). Posner identifies three core elements of pragmatism: 
The first is a distrust of metaphysical entities (“reality,” “truth,” “nature,” etc.) 
viewed as warrants for certitude whether in epistemology, ethics, or politics. 
The second is an insistence that propositions be tested by the consequences, 
by the difference they make---and if they make none, set aside. The third is an 
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tive approach has been “experimental,” a continuing trial-and-error 
process of resolving conflict while guided by the aim of generating pro-
gressive social and political improvement.24 Furthermore, ardent prag-
matists contend that judicial decision-making should be a process that 
genuinely considers and seeks to improve the status of the dominated 
and marginalized groups.25 
 Methodologically, judicial review of constitutional conflicts has 
been largely performed through a balancing process known as “weigh-
ing,” or the “proportionality principle.”26 The balancing method has 
been carried out with minor variations27 as a three-pronged test focus-
ing on fairness and even-handedness standards.28 This test is described 
as follows: 
The first stage involves establishing the degree of non-
satisfaction of, or a detriment to, a first principle. This is fol-
lowed by a second stage in which the importance of satisfying 
the competing principle is established. Finally, in the third 
                                                                                                                      
insistence on judging our projects, whether scientific, ethical, political, or le-
gal, by their conformity to social or other human needs rather than to “objec-
tive,” “impersonal” criteria. 
Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in Pragmatism in Law and Society 
29, 35–36 (Robert W. Gordon & Margaret Jane Radin eds., 1991). 
24 See Posner, supra note 21, at 9. 
25 See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1532–37 (1988); Frank I. Mi-
chelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 4, 73–77 (1986); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 14–15 (1987); see also David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule 
of Law 44–46 (2004) (arguing that liberty is better protected by courts where judges rea-
son pragmatically, and dedicating chapter two to a comparative analysis of religious free-
dom cases). 
26 See Beatty, supra note 25, at 159–60; Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean 
Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 16, 17 (1988); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Propor-
tionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 72, 73–74 
(2008); Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 Int’l J. Const. L. 
468, 468 (2009). 
27 See Stephen Gardbaum, A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing, 4 L. & Ethics 
Hum. Rts. 73, 83 (2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol4/iss1/art5. But cf. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing 63 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 293, 294 (1992) (arguing that neither balancing nor the categorization ap-
proach solely exemplifies the general constitutional theory in the U.S. context). 
28 See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.); S. Afr. Const. § 36, 1996. 
These texts specifically prescribe a balancing test for constitutional conflicts. Other texts, 
however, have provided specific limitations in the context of particular rights. See, e.g., 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 (prescribing limitations on religious freedom). 
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stage, it is established whether the importance of satisfying the 
latter principle justifies the detriment to or non-satisfaction of 
the former.29 
 The nature and scope of the balancing process has been a subject 
of ample debate. For proponents, balancing is justifiable as a technique 
that optimizes the reconciliation of rights guarantees with the demands 
of pluralism in contemporary democracies. Pound, an avid advocate of 
balancing, wrote in the 1940s: 
The law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to 
adjust . . . overlapping and often conflicting claims and de-
mands, either through securing them directly and immedi-
ately, or through securing certain individual interests, or 
through delimitations, or compromises of individual interests, 
so as to give effect to the greatest total of interests or to the in-
terests that weigh most in our civilization, with the least sacri-
fice to the scheme of interests as a whole.30 
More recent advocacy has emphasized the normative rationality of bal-
ancing, including: (i) the best available method to neutrally reconcile 
constitutional conflicts;31 (ii) a method providing the guarantee that 
political institutions do not exceed their “intrinsic power” to override 
fundamental rights in the interest of public policy objectives;32 and (iii) 
a technique that produces order and transparency in the legal decision-
making process.33 
 Scholarly critique of the balancing process is abundant, with three 
primary concerns standing out. The first major criticism centers on the 
claim that the act of balancing lacks objective and uniform criteria.34 It 
is impossible to point toward a common or universal balancing scale 
that judges could adopt, necessarily transforming the act of balancing 
into a subjective and unpredictable process that invites judges to rely on 
personal experiences and preferences.35 Therefore, this ad hoc process 
involves a real possibility of error in identifying the competing values as 
                                                                                                                      
29 Alexy, supra note 16, at 574; see also Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy 167 
(2006). 
30 Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 39 (1943). 
31 Beatty, supra note 25, at 159–61. 
32 Gardbaum, supra note 27, at 84–85. 
33 Barak, supra note 29, at 164, 173. 
34 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 
972–76 (1987). 
35 Id. 
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well as in constructing the just and correct balance between them. The 
second type of criticism argues that the act of balancing implicitly pre-
supposes the commensurability of all constitutional conflicts and their 
inevitable resolution, which “necessarily overrides the broader political 
question of its irreconcilability.”36 Furthermore, once the conflict is 
staged in legal terms, we presuppose and accept that one principle will 
trump the other, curbing the prospects of a more accommodative com-
promise.37 Finally, critics have warned that balancing substantially ex-
pands judicial discretion and thereby replicates “the job that a democ-
ratic society demands of its legislature.”38 
 These criticisms were part of a broader call for judicial restraint. 
Critics of judicial activism argued that the process of judicial review is 
undemocratic, bestowing far too much authority in the hands of a small 
group of unelected and unaccountable judges.39 Critics claimed that 
the unnecessary involvement of judges in the determination of social 
values encroaches on the authority of political actors representing the 
majority.40 Thus, the facilitation of social conflicts should arguably take 
place through legislation as opposed to judicial decision-making, with 
basic rights sorted out through accountable majoritarian processes.41 
The process of legislation entails democratic participation and involves 
deliberative politics that requires persuasion and reflection upon pref-
erences, generating stronger commitment to “hear the other side.”42 
Legislative outcomes, according to the democratic critics of judicial ac-
tivism, better ensure the prospects of peaceful coexistence. 
 To empirically evaluate these theoretical debates, the next section 
analyzes legal outcomes stemming from legislative measures and judi-
cial rulings in circumstances involving the weighing of minority reli-
                                                                                                                      
36 Scott Veitch, Moral Conflict and Legal Reasoning 186 (1999). 
37 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Dis-
course, at xi (1991) (discussing the impoverishment of political discourse through judi-
cial decision-making). 
38 See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 984. 
39 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 182–84 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Dignity of Legislation 4–5(1999). 
40 See Ofrit Liviatan, Judicial Activism and Religion-Based Tensions in India and Israel, 26 
Ariz J. Int’l & Comp. L. 583, 587 (2009) (summarizing arguments that are critical of judi-
cial activism). 
41 See Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of 
the Constitutionality of Democracy, at viii (2007). There are other notable advocates 
of the democratic approach. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: 
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra 
note 39; Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, supra note 39. 
42 Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conflict 8 (2000). 
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gious practices against competing claims that invoke alternative liberal 
norms including liberty, equality, and public interest objectives. 
II. The Treatment of Religious Minorities in  
Western Democracies 
 Scholars attributed the politics of difference emerging during the 
second half of the Twentieth century to the success of generating “new 
and more pluralistic forms of democratic citizenship” within “estab-
lished Western democracies.”43 Increasingly, these democracies view 
pluralism and coexistence as their legitimizing model, striving to effec-
tuate them through domestic and international legal instruments.44 
The following analysis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
account of the religious freedom regimes in the Western world. Reli-
gious freedom regimes differ greatly as a result of many factors, includ-
ing varying constitutional structures and context-specific precedents. 
The following survey provides a brief sketch of selected religion-based 
issues, in an attempt to identify general patterns in the rhetoric and 
outcomes of conflicts involving religious minorities. 
A. Classifying Religions 
 Many constitutions and other human rights instruments guarantee 
protection to religious liberty without defining religion.45 In deciding 
disputes concerning religion, liberal courts have shown a general ten-
dency to refrain from value judgment over the nature or appropriate-
ness of a religious claim, recognizing the personal and subjective aspect 
of such a system of belief.46 Instead, legal rulings have focused primar-
ily on evaluating whether the specific circumstances warrant derogation 
                                                                                                                      
43 Bashir Bashir & Will Kymlicka, Introduction: Struggles for Inclusion and Reconciliation in 
Modern Democracies, in The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies 2–
3 (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008). See generally Parekh, supra note 10 (discuss-
ing the effects of the politics of difference). 
44 See Bashir & Kymlicka, supra note 43, at 12; T. Jeremy Gunn, The Permissible Scope of 
Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Perspective, 19 Emory Int’l 
L. Rev. vii, vii–viii (2005). 
45 T. Jeremy Gunn, Complexity of Religion and the Definition of Religion in International 
Law, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 189, 190 (2003); Nathaniel Stinnett, Note, Defining Away Reli-
gious Freedom in Europe: How Four Democracies Get Away with Discriminating Against Minority 
Religions, 28 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 429, 443 (2005); see T. Jeremy Gunn, supra note 44, 
at vii–viii. 
46 See Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State 110 (2005). 
See also Uitz, supra note 3, at 24 (European context); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A 
Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 233, 241 (1989) (U.S. context). 
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from religious freedom guarantees.47 A notable exception was the Eng-
lish Court’s construction of religion “concerned with man’s relations 
with God.”48 Consequently, the English Court declined to recognize 
groups such as Scientology and South Place Ethical Society as religions, 
because they do not worship a Supreme Being but rather emphasize 
moral and ethical principles in their spiritual approach to life.49 
 Unlike the restrained approach characterizing the attempt to de-
fine religion, recognizing and categorizing religious communities for 
legal purposes has been a widespread European practice, and one that 
has proven to be particularly discriminatory in relation to minority reli-
gious groups. Domestic laws of many European nations dictate a formal 
recognition process of religious denominations, generally by way of 
their registration in a designated governmental body.50 Originating as 
                                                                                                                      
47See Church of New Faith v Comm’r of Pay-Roll Tax [1982–83] 154 CLR 120, 136 (Austl.). 
The High Court of Australia illustrated this pattern by recognizing Scientology as a relig-
ion for the purposes of charity law. The Court held the criteria of religion to be: 
[F]irst, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and second, the 
acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, though 
canons of conduct which offend against ordinary laws are outside the area of 
any immunity, privilege or right conferred on the grounds of religion. 
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court went even further when examining a conscientious objector’s 
religious objection to war, finding religious belief to be anything that “occupies a place in 
the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the Orthodox belief in God.” United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965). More recently, the Canadian Supreme Court continued 
this trend by adopting a “subjective understanding” criterion for religious freedom under 
the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: this criterion states that once an indi-
vidual demonstrates the sincerity of his or her beliefs, it is irrelevant whether such a belief 
or practice is “required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of 
religious officials.” Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 580 (Can.). 
48 In re South Place Ethical Society, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565, [1571] (Eng.). 
49 See id.; R v. Registrar Gen.,[1970] 2 Q.B. 697 at 707 (U.K.). In 2006 the definition of 
religion for charity purposes was amended in the Charities Act, defining religion to in-
clude a belief in god, belief in many gods or belief in no god. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, p. 
1, § 2(3). 
50 See, e.g., Bundegesetz über die Rechtspersönlichkeit von religiösen Bekenntnisgemein-
schaften [Federal Statute Concerning the Legal Status of Religious Communities] Jan. 9, 
1998, Bundegesetzblatt [BGBl I] at 485, § 3 (Austria) [hereinafter Austrian Religious 
Communities Act]; Religisko Organizaciju Likums [Law on Religious Organizations] § 8(1) 
(1995) (Lat.); Lei da Liberdade Religiosa [Law on Religious Freedom] No. 16/2001, art. 33 
(2001) (Port.), available at http://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/dokument/portugal.htm (translation by 
The Church Law Society, Prague, Czech Republic) [hereinafter 2001 Portuguese Law on 
Religious Freedom]; Zákon č. 308/1991 Zb. o slobode náboženskej viery a postavení cirkví a 
náboženských spoločností [Law on the Freedom of Religious Faith and the Position of 
Churches and Religious Societies] No. 308/1991, art. 10, § 1 (1991) (Slovk.), available at 
http://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/aj/308-91en.htm (translation by The Church Law Society, Prague, 
Czech Republic) [hereinafter 1991 Slovak Act on Freedom of Religious Beliefs]; General Act 
of Religious Liberty art. V, § 1 (B.O.E. 1980, 177) (Spain). 
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cooperative arrangements between church and state, the purpose of 
this recognition process is to acquire a legal personality, giving rise to 
different benefits including financial support, tax privileges, advantages 
under military laws, and the ability to insert religion as part of the gen-
eral curriculum of educational institutions funded by the state.51 From 
the government’s perspective, this process serves the goals of supervi-
sion and control and furthers the orderly relationship between the state 
and religious movements.52 Arguably, this inquisitive procedure averts 
the dangers that “fleeting beliefs, or ones which are believed to present 
a threat to other human rights and values,” will enjoy the status of rec-
ognized religions.53 
 Nevertheless, this system of recognition often evolved into a de fac-
to multi-tiered discriminatory apparatus, enabling the classification of 
religious movements into different categories with differing rights.54 
Thresholds, including sizable membership, visibility, organizational re-
quirements, and mandatory waiting periods have effectively preserved 
the privileged status of the established religions, blocking the registra-
tion of newer religions.55 This reality is ever more problematic consider-
ing the historically privileged status of the Christian Churches in many 
European countries.56 Under this system, recognized religions have typ-
ically included leading Christian denominations, Islam, and Judaism. 
Religious communities newer to Europe, namely Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Scientology, the Unification Church, and in some instances even Mor-
monism were repeatedly denied recognition.57 Although domestic 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) routinely 
intervened to alleviate discrimination against religious minorities, the 
                                                                                                                      
51 See, e.g., 2001 Portuguese Law on Religious Freedom, supra note 50, arts. 12, 24, 33 
(establishing such benefits for recognized religions). 
52 See Uitz, supra note 3, at 93–94. 
53 Ann-Marie Mooney Cotter, Heaven Forbid 14 (2009). 
54 See James T. Richardson, Regulating Religion: A Sociological and Historical Introduction, 
in Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe 1, 6 ( James T. Rich-
ardson ed., 2004). 
55 See Cotter, supra note 53, at 10; Stinnett, supra note 45, at 430. 
56 See Uitz, supra note 3, at 94. As noted by Uitz, “the intensity of legal recognition 
(and its consequences) tends to favour those churches which are understood (at least by 
an elite of a majority) to have contributed to the formation of the history, identity, culture 
or other underlying values of the polity.” Id. 
57 See, e.g., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Review Conference, 
Sept. 1999, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Laws Affecting the Structuring of Religious Communities 
at 21, 32–33, OSCE/ODIHRBackground paper 1999/4, available at http://www.osce.org/ 
odihr/documents/16698 (discussing a case which dealt with discrimination against Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses). 
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institutional discrimination generated by this system of classifications 
remains present throughout Europe.58 
 The 1998 Austrian Act on the Legal Status of Registered Religious 
Communities (Religious Communities Act) illustrates the discrimina-
tory apparatus entailed by the recognition procedure.59 This legislation 
was enacted in response to the ruling by the Austrian Court requiring 
the government to provide a legislative solution to the prolonged strug-
gle of Jehovah’s Witnesses for legal recognition.60 This legislation sub-
stantially toughened the criteria for registration and recognition of reli-
gious groups. The threshold for recognition includes a twenty-year 
proven existence in Austria, a membership of 0.2% of the Austrian pop-
ulation, and a vague requirement of a positive basic attitude toward so-
ciety and state.61 These harsh prerequisites did not affect the already 
recognized groups, which continue to enjoy the benefits of recognition 
regardless of their ability to fulfill the criteria of the Religious Commu-
nities Act.62 The legislative history of the Religious Communities Act 
reveals a political and cultural consensus on the necessity to act against 
certain minority religious denominations widely perceived as “inher-
ently dangerous” for being “antifamily and even anti-Christian.”63 
B. Islamic Dress in Educational Institutions 
 In recent decades Islam rapidly grew into Europe’s largest religious 
minority.64 This demographical transformation generated increased 
social distrust, with a growing number of Europeans identifying Islam as 
a threatening force to Europe’s Christian heritage and secular legal ar-
                                                                                                                      
58 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2010) (noting that many 
countries, including Austria, France, Germany, Greece, and England, do not recognize Sci-
entology as a religion). 
59 Austrian Religious Communities Act, supra note 50, at 485, § 3. 
60 See Christopher J. Miner, Losing My Religion: Austria’s New Religion Law in Light of In-
ternational and European Standards of Religious Freedom, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 607, 615; Reinhard 
Kohlhofer, Away with Legal Discrimination—Serbia Shouldn’t Follow Austria, WorldWide Re-
ligious News (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.wwrn.org/articles/8300/. 
61 See Austrian Religious Communities Act, supra note 50, § 11(1). 
62 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Aus-
tria (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127298.htm; see also Miner, 
supra note 60, at 617 (noting that out of the twelve recognized religions, only Catholic, Lu-
theran, Islam, and Old Catholic would qualify under the new standards of the 1998 Act). 
63 Miner, supra note 60, at 616, 620. Among those perceived as dangerous groups Miner 
listed Scientology, the Unification Church, Transcendental Mediation, Yoga, Hare Krishna, 
and others. 
64 See The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, at vii (Roberta Aluffi 
B.-P. & Giovanna Zincone eds., 2004). 
2011] Legal Arrangements in Religion-Based Conflicts Involving Minorities 65 
rangements.65 The most prevalent manifestation of this cultural anxiety 
has been the growing resistance throughout Europe toward the visibility 
of traditional Muslim female attire in educational institutions.66 The 
opposition to the Muslim attire in public schools united two normally 
atypical allies in European politics:67 (i) The feminist-liberal position, 
which views the headscarf as a mark of political extremism and the defi-
ance of gender equality;68 and (ii) Christian-conservatives, which view 
the visibility of the Islamic headscarf as a threat to Christian-European 
en
thin European educational institutions was system-
tica
                                                                                                                     
id tity.69 
 There is no unified European approach with regard to Islamic at-
tire in schools, and many states do not forbid students (and in some 
cases teachers) from wearing Islamic attire in public schools. Yet, when 
this matter came under legal consideration—whether under legislative 
or judicial proceedings—the right to manifest Islamic beliefs by wear-
ing Islamic attire wi
a lly denied.70 
 France has the highest percentage of Muslim population in West-
ern Europe.71 There, the Islamic female attire has been generating 
considerable controversy since the late 1980s.72 Debates revolving 
 
65 See José Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration, in Re-
ligion in an Expanding Europe 65, 78–80 (Timothy A. Byrnes & Peter J. Katzenstein 
eds., 2006); Silvio Ferrari, Islam in Europe: An Introduction to Legal Problems and Perspectives, in 
The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, supra note 64, at 1, 3–4; Sami 
Zemni, Islam, European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism, in Religious Freedom and 
the Neutrality of the State: the Position of Islam in the European Union 158, 159 
(W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. van Koningsveld eds., 2002). See generally András Sajó, Preliminaries to 
a Concept of Constitutional Secularism, 6 Int’l J. Const. L. 605 (2008) (discussing religion 
and constitutional secularism). 
66 See Valérie Amiraux, The Headscarf Question: What is Really the Issue? in European Is-
lam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy 124–26 (Samir Amghar et al. eds., 
2007). 
67 See Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil 125–27 (2007); Hans Michael 
Heinig, The Headscarf of a Muslim Teacher in German Public Schools, in Religion in the Public 
Sphere: A Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, American and International Law 
181, 186 (Winifred Brugger & Michael Karayanni eds., 2007). 
68 See Scott, supra note 67, at 125–27. 
69 See Heinig, supra note 67, at 186. 
70 See, e.g., R v. Governors of Denbigh High School (Begum), [2006] UKHC 15, [2007] 1 
A.C. 100, [H.L.] 100--101 (appeal taken from Eng.); Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, 49 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 179, 179 (2009); Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 109, 
109--10 (2005). 
71 See The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Mapping the Global Muslim 
Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Popu-
lation 21 (Oct. 2009), http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Demographics/Muslim 
population.pdf 
72 Patrick Weil, Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2699, 2701 (2009). 
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around the impact of Islam’s visibility in the public sphere have focused 
on France’s fundamental constitutional principle of laïcité, the French 
version of secularism.73 This public debate culminated in the enact-
ment of a 2004 law by an overwhelming majority—494 for, 36 against, 
31 abstentions74—banning overtly religious symbols or dress in public 
schools as a necessary step for securing the secular nature of the Re-
public.75 Although the law prohibited conspicuous religious symbols 
generally, its primary motivation was to ban the public display of Is-
lamic headscarves. 76 The circumstances leading to the ban are widely 
documented:77 (i) an emerging political coalition of secular and reli-
gious streams connecting the visibility of Islamic headscarves in 
France’s public sphere to contemporary social and political problems, 
including immigration challenges, racism and gender-based concerns; 
(ii) extensive media coverage inflaming public agitation over Islam’s 
public presence; and (iii) the appointment of the Stasi Commission, a 
government-appointed commission tasked with investigating the appli-
cation of laïcité in France, which found the Islamic headscarf to be un-
justifiably coercive and victimizing of Muslim girls. In this public at-
mosphere Islam came to be regarded as an imminent threat to France’s 
secular tradition, repudiating any real possibility to consider the Islamic 
headscarf as the expression of a genuine religious belief.78 
                                                                                                                      
73 See John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves 1–4 (2007). 
74 Weil, supra note 72, at 2701. 
75 Loi 2004–228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le 
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, 
collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004–228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application 
of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb 
which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools], Journal Offi-
ciel de law République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, 
p. 5190; see T. Jeremy Gunn, Under God but Not the Scarf: The Founding Myths of Religious Free-
dom in the United States and Laïcité in France, 46 J. Church & St. 7, 7 (2004). 
76 Bowen, supra note 73, at 1 (“Although worded in a religion-neutral way, everyone 
understood the law to be aimed at keeping Muslim girls from wearing headscarves in 
school”); Scott, supra note 67, at 1–2 (“[T]he law . . . was aimed primarily at Muslim girls 
wearing headscarves . . . . The other groups were included to undercut the charge of dis-
crimination against Muslims and to comply with a requirement that such laws apply uni-
versally.”). 
77 See Bowen, supra note 73, at 1; Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam 1 
(George Holoch trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2007); Scott, supra note 67, at 74; Gunn, 
supra note 75, at 18. See generally Eva Brems, Above Children’s Heads: The Headscarf Controversy 
in European Schools from the Perspective of Children’s Rights, 14 Int’l J. Child Rts. 119 (2006) 
(providing background information on France’s 2004 law banning headscarves, with an 
emphasis on the rights of the child). 
78 See Bowen, supra note 73, at 31–32; Scott, supra note 67, at 90; Gunn, supra note 
75, at 17–18. 
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 The German debate on headscarves erupted with the Ludin case, 
brought by a public school teacher who was denied employment for 
wearing the Islamic headscarf.79 The Federal Court framed the ques-
tion as a clash between the right of a government official in her public 
role to manifest her religion and the right of students and parents to 
abstain from religion.80 The Court concluded that although there is an 
“abstract danger” to the school’s neutral environment, a ban on Islamic 
headscarves could only be implemented by a state law and not by ad-
ministrative decisions.81 Without the necessary statutory basis, denying 
the teacher her right to religious freedom was unconstitutional.82 
 At the same time, the Court stressed that the German states have 
full discretion to arrive at different outcomes, taking “into account 
school traditions, the composition of the population by religion, and 
whether it is more or less strongly rooted in religion.”83 The ruling 
generated an immediate stream of German Land (State) Laws banning 
public school teachers from wearing headscarves, with some laws even 
exempting displays of Christian and Jewish symbols.84 The court’s head-
scarf anxiety has been explained as a distinct German “assumption that 
Christian culture occupies a privileged place in German public life, and 
is, indeed, a postulate of German political identity and social cohesion. 
Consequently its explicit affirmation in the public school context is a 
compelling state interest.”85 
 In England, the House of Lords held that a public school’s denial 
to allow its student, Shabina Begum, to wear the Muslim jilbab did not 
violate her right to religious freedom under Article 9 of the European 
                                                                                                                      
79 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVefG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, docket 
number 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 1 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
rs20030924_2bvr143602en.html. 
80 Id. at para. 46. 
81 Id. at para. 72. 
82 See Oliver Gerstenberg, Germany: Freedom of Conscience in Public Schools, 3 Int’l J. Const. 
L. 94, 96 (2005); Christine Langenfeld & Sarah Mohsen, Germany: The Teacher Headscarf Case, 
Int’l J. Const. L. 86, 89 (2005). 
83 BVefG, at para. 47. 
84 Heinig, supra note 67, at 194 n.34. Of Germany’s sixteen states, legal restrictions on 
Muslim dress have been imposed by the following states: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Bre-
men, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, and Saarland have enacted headscarf bans 
for teachers in public schools; Berlin and Hesse have enacted headscarf bans for all civil 
servants. See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: 
Germany (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127312.htm. On the 
laws of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony, see David W. Hendon & Jeremiah 
Russell, Notes on Church-State Affairs, 47 J. Church & St. 189, 191 (2005). 
85 See Gerstenberg, supra note 82, at 96–7. 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).86 The school had a mandatory 
dress code, but created a Muslim dress option (shalwar kameeze) for its 
majority of Muslim students.87 It denied Begum’s request to wear the 
very traditional jilbab out of fear that this would pressure other students 
to conform to more extreme versions of Islam.88 The school further 
suspected that Begum’s decision was unduly influenced by her brother, 
who belonged to a radical Islamic group.89 The House of Lords found 
the school’s decision justified, and concluded that the school was in a 
better position than the Lords to assess external threats on its stu-
dents.90 The House of Lords’ narrative is characterized by a stark con-
trast between sheer praise of the school and its headmaster’s civility as 
compared to the characterization of Begum and her brother, who was 
depicted as possessing a confrontational and threatening attitude.91 
                                                                                                                     
 Baroness Hale’s opinion is a telling example of a widely held Eu-
ropean approach to the clash between claims to religious freedom that 
entrench patriarchal practices and women’s rights to equality and non-
discrimination.92 Baroness Hale seemed unconvinced of Begum’s abil-
ity, given Begum’s young age, to reach comprehensive decisions about 
the extent of her belief and its manifestation in her chosen attire.93 
 
86 See Begum, [2007] 1 A.C. at 119. Article nine of the ECHR prescribes the following: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, ei-
ther alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. 
87 See Begum, [2007] 1 A.C. at 108. 
88 Id. at 111. 
89 Id. at 109. 
90 Gareth Davies, The House of Lords and Religious Clothing in Begum v. Head Teacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School, 13 Eur. Pub. L. 423, 426 (2007) (noting this problem-
atic line of reasoning, arguing that even excellent school authorities can sometimes err in 
judgment). 
91 See Begum, [2007] 1 A.C. at 108--09, 117, 119–22, 127–30. 
92 See id. at 134 (Baroness Hale). For a comprehensive discussion of this clash, see gen-
erally Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and Gender, 1 Int. J. Const. L. 663 (2003), quoted in 
Begum, [2007] 1 A.C at 134--35 (Baroness Hale). 
93 Begum, [2007] 1 A.C at 132 (Baroness Hale) (“The child is on the brink of, but has 
not yet reached, adolescence. She may have views but they are unlikely to be decisive. 
More importantly, she has not yet reached the critical stage in her development where this 
particular choice may matter to her.”). 
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Concerned with the dominating effect of the Muslim dress on young 
women, Baroness Hale relied on scholarship alerting of the dangers 
that religious coverings entail for the continued gender discrimination 
in patriarchal religions, noting: 
Strict dress codes may be imposed upon women, not for their 
own sake but to serve the ends of others. Hence they may be 
denied equal freedom to choose for themselves. They may al-
so be denied equal treatment. A dress code which requires 
women to conceal all but their face and hands, while leaving 
men much freer to decide what they will wear, does not treat 
them equally.94 
 Furthermore, in Baroness Hale’s view the school has a transforma-
tive liberal duty. She explained that this task entailed “educat[ing] the 
young from all the many and diverse families and communities in this 
country in accordance with the national curriculum.”95 As such, Hale 
concluded: 
Like it or not, [England] is a society committed, in principle 
and in law, to equal freedom for men and women to choose 
how they will lead their lives within the law. Young girls from 
ethnic, cultural or religious minorities growing up here face 
particularly difficult choices: how far to adopt or to distance 
themselves from the dominant culture. A good school will en-
able and support them. This particular school is a good school 
. . . .96 
 Guided by its “margin of appreciation” doctrine, the ECtHR in all 
of its cases concerning the Islamic headscarf has systematically deferred 
to the policies of national authorities and the expertise of domestic 
courts.97 The ECtHR’s leading holding on the issue, Sahin v. Turkey, 
endorsed the view that the Islamic headscarf became a political symbol 
undermining secularism, a principle that was claimed by the Turkish 
government to serve as the guarantor of its democratic system.98 A simi-
lar rationale led the ECtHR to uphold the expulsion of students from a 
public secondary school in France. In particular, the ECtHR found that 
student expulsion following a refusal to remove their headscarves dur-
                                                                                                                      
94 See id. at 134. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 126–27 (2007). 
98 See Sahin v. Turkey, App No. 44774/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 109, 119, 134 (2005). 
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ing sports classes was compatible with the French core principle of 
laïcité.99 
 In Dahlab v. Switzerland, the ECtHR held that prohibiting a primary 
school teacher from wearing a headscarf in class was “necessary in a 
democratic society,” accepting the Swiss Federal Court’s opinion that 
such prohibition furthered principles of denominational neutrality and 
gender equality protected by the Swiss Constitution.100 The ECtHR ac-
knowledged that there was no evidence of any impact on the children 
and “no complaints from parents or pupils to date.”101 Nevertheless, 
the ECtHR considered the headscarf a powerful external symbol that 
“might have some kind of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be 
imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and 
which . . . is hard to square with the principle of gender equality.”102 
Therefore, the ECtHR concluded that it “appears difficult to reconcile 
the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, re-
spect for others, and, above all, equality and non-discrimination.”103 
C. Monitoring Religious Movements 
 The arrival of Islam in Europe coincided with the surfacing of reli-
gious movements previously unknown in the European religious land-
scape, commonly referred to as New Religious Movements (NRMs).104 
Since the early 1970s, groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church 
of Scientology, Seventh Day Adventists, and the Unification Church 
                                                                                                                      
99 See e.g., Dogru 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 179–81; Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2009) http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc/ (follow “HUDOC 
database” hyperlink; then check “Judgments” box on left side; then type “31645” in “Applica-
tion Number Field”; then click “Search” hyperlink; then click hyperlink to result in French); 
see also Kelaliv v. Turkey, App. No. 67585/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 24, 2006) http://www. 
echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc/ (follow “HUDOC database” hyperlink; then check “Judg-
ments” box on left side; then type “67585” in “Application Number Field;” then click 
“Search” hyperlink; then click hyperlink to only result in English) (finding no violation of 
Article 9); Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H. R. 66 (uphold-
ing the denial of a graduation certificate from a student who refused to take off her head-
scarf for a required picture on the certificate). 
100 Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 2001), at *9, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc/ (follow “HUDOC database” hyperlink; then 
check “Decision” box on left side; then type “42393” in “Application Number Field;” then 
click “Search” hyperlink; then click hyperlink to only result). 
101 Id. at *3. 
102 Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
103 Id. 
104 See Silvio Ferrari, New Religious Movements in Western Europe, Religioscope, 2 (Oct. 
2006), http://religion.info/pdf/2006_10_ferrari_nrm.pdf (noting that the term “New Reli-
gious Movement” is misleading, because some of these movements existed for many years). 
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have become noticeably successful in attracting followers among the 
young and the middle class.105 The visible growth of NRMs throughout 
Europe prompted hegemonic anxieties by the Christian churches and 
suspicion by anti-cult secularists. This translated into an ongoing clash 
between the state’s view of its role in protecting public safety and the 
expectations of NRMs to freely associate and practice their religion.106 
 National and pan-European investigative commissions were estab-
lished with an expansive mandate to assess the potential threat of 
NRMs, particularly in relation to accusations of brainwashing, psycho-
logical manipulations, and financial exploitation.107 The work of these 
commissions generated publications that were critical of NRMs, includ-
ing lists classifying them according to “danger level” along with rec-
ommendations to monitor their activities.108 These developments moti-
vated considerable exertion of control over NRMs in Europe, notably 
in France, Belgium, and Germany. Such exertion has been categorized 
as excessive and unnecessarily burdensome on religious liberty.109 
 Two primary trajectories characterize the regulatory campaign 
against NRMs in Europe. First, specific laws were enacted to implement 
                                                                                                                      
105 See James A. Beckford, Cult Controversies 122 (1985); Mikael Rothstein, Regu-
lating New Religions in Denmark, in Regulating Religion, supra note 54, at 221, 226; Natha-
lie Luca, Is There a Unique French Policy of Cults?, in Regulating Religion, supra note 54, at 
53–54. 
106 See, e.g., Uitz, supra note 3, at 177–78; Hervieu-Léger, supra note 3, at 55–56; James 
T. Richardson & Massimo Introvigne, Brainwashing Theories and Administrative Reports on 
Cults and Sects, in Regulating Religion, supra note 54, at 151, 172–74. Sociologists of 
religion explained the extreme reaction to NRMs within Western Europe as a combination 
of factors, including: (i) NRMs’ religious alternative is perceived as a threat to the histori-
cal hegemony of Christianity in Europe; (ii) a rise of nationalism attributing the rising 
popularity of NRMs in Europe to American imperialism; (iii) anti-religion sentiments in a 
secularizing Europe; and (iv) mass media amplification of NRMs’ controversies. See Beck-
ford, supra note 105, at 239–40, 271–74; Bryan Wilson, The Social Dimension of Sec-
tarianism 46–47, 66–68 (1990); Eileen Barker, Types of Sacred Space and European Responses 
to New Religious Movements, in Clashes of Knowledge 155, 165, 167 (Peter Musburger et 
al. eds., 2008); James A. Beckford, The Mass Media and New Religious Movements, in New 
Religious Movements 103, 116 (Bryan Wilson & Jamie Cresswell eds., 1999); Bryan Wil-
son, Absolutes and Relatives: Two Problems for New Religious Movements, in Challenging Re-
ligion 12, 12 ( James A. Beckford & James T. Richardson eds., 2003). 
107 See Ferrari, supra note 104, at 10–16 (describing how various European states inves-
tigated “NRMS”); see also James T. Richardson & Massimo Introvigne, “Brainwashing” Theo-
ries in European Parliamentary and Administrative Reports on “Cults” and “Sects,” 40 J. Sci. 
Study Religion 143, 144 (2001) (criticizing the reports produced by the commissions). 
108 See New Religious Movements in the 21st Century 346–48 (Philip Charles Lu-
cas & Thomas Robbins eds., 2004). 
109 See Uitz, supra note 3, at 170–78; Barker, supra note 106, at 167–68; cf. Richardson 
& Introvigne, supra note 107, at 144 (Richardson and Introvigne note a wide consensus 
among scholars that NRMs “represent neither a danger to their members or to the state”). 
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recommendations to ban and dissolve NRMs.110 One notable example 
is the 2001 French law, known as the “About-Picard Law,” designed to 
repress cults and facilitate the prosecution of their leaders.111 These 
types of laws attracted wide criticism both for their lack of definition of 
what constitutes a “dangerous cult” and for their expansive language, 
broad enough to authorize a ban of any legal entity that is construed as 
engaging in psychological subjection.112 The incentive to legislate such 
expansive powers to ban NRMs has been explained as a “broad consen-
sus . . . that the fight against sects should be a necessary aspect of the 
protection of individual liberties and that this fight should prevail, in 
the final analysis, over the defense of the right of each individual to 
freedom of religion.”113 
 The second type of legal action taken against NRMs consisted of 
establishing governmental bureaucracies with an expansive mandate 
devoted to identifying and combating the influence of sects. Notable 
examples include the establishment of the French Interministerial Mis-
sion of Vigilance and Combat Against Sectarian Aberrations,114 Belgian 
agencies responsible for gathering information and monitoring the 
harmful activities of NRMs,115 Germany’s Office for the Protection of 
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114 See Mission Interministérielle de Vigilance et de Lutte contre le Dérives 
Sectaires, http://www.miviludes.gouv.fr (last visited Nov. 27, 2010). 
115 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom: Belgium 
(Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127301.htm (discussing Belgium’s 
two government agencies established for this purpose, the Center for Information and Ad-
vice on Harmful Sectarian Organizations (CIAOSN) and the Interagency Coordination 
Group on “harmful sects”); see also Willy Faturé, Belgium’s Anti-Sect War, 12(4) Soc. Just. Res. 
377, 387–92 (1999). 
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the Constitution (OPC),116 and the Austrian Society Against Sect and 
Cult Dangers (GSK).117 The work of these bureaucracies generally in-
volves NRM surveillance, advising authorities and the general public of 
the potential risks of NRMs, coordinating the appropriate responses 
against NRM activities, and helping victims of cult abuses.118 These ad-
ministrative measures have been criticized as overly intrusive, contribut-
ing to an overall climate of stigmatization and intolerance toward NRM 
communities and their individual members.119 
 Thus far, the ECtHR has not shielded NRMs within Western Eu-
rope from these drastic domestic monitoring measures. In the two cases 
coming under its review, the ECtHR did not lay down a substantive 
holding on NRM monitoring. It rejected the admissibility of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ complaint against the French Law banning dangerous sects, 
finding that the law had not been directly invoked against them.120 An-
other petition by a Jehovah’s Witness against the surveillance of Greek 
authorities ended in an out-of-court settlement.121 
D. Treatment of Indigenous Religions 
 The special nature of indigenous religions has often come in direct 
conflict with Western policies designed to protect important public in-
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120 See Fédération Chrétienne des Témoins de Jéhova de France v. France, App. No. 
53430/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 6, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc/ (follow 
“HUDOC database” hyperlink; then check “Decisions” box on left side; then type “53430” in 
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121 Tsavachidis v. Greece, App. No. 28802/95, at paras. 21--24 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 19, 
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terests such as environmental policies, drug prevention, and economic 
development.122 Considering the discriminatory treatment that indige-
nous societies have often been exposed to, liberal ideals promote strong 
and comprehensive protection to indigenous peoples. One such exam-
ple is the international construction of the right to self-determination in 
international law as including the protection for religious freedom.123 
Nevertheless, the religious freedom of Native Americans in the United 
States exemplifies the discrepancy between this liberal ideal and its exe-
cution in practice. 
 The systematic discrimination against the Native American culture 
in the United States has been widely documented. Being America’s 
“smallest, poorest and weakest minority group,” Native Americans suf-
fered a long and shameful history of government religious suppression 
“in ways unprecedented for other religions.”124 These suppressive 
measures included outright prohibitions on tribal religious rituals, 
dances, dress, hairstyle, language, and access to religious sites.125 
 Beginning in the 1960s Congress passed a number of bills de-
signed to protect religious freedom of Native Americans. The Bald and 
Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA) exempted Native Americans 
from the general prohibition on the use and possession of eagles and 
eagle parts.126 However, this religious exemption was narrowly con-
strued by the judiciary to include only those individuals who are Native 
Americans by blood and belong to federally recognized Tribes.127 An 
additional challenge to protecting Native American religions has been 
a lack of enforcement mechanisms accompanying protective legisla-
tion. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) is one such 
example.128 This legislation is notable in its recognition of and sensitiv-
ity to Native American culture. It prescribes: 
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and pre-
serve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to 
believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Daniel K. Inouye, Discrimination and Native American Religious Rights, 23 UWLA L. 
Rev. 3, 13–14 (1992). 
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 1, 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
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124 Inouye, supra note 122, at 3–4, 7. 
125 Id. at 13–14. 
126 See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006). 
127 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740–45 (1986); United States v. Antoine, 
318 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 
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2011] Legal Arrangements in Religion-Based Conflicts Involving Minorities 75 
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, in-
cluding but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of 
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremo-
nials and traditional rites.129 
Notwithstanding, this legislation amounts only to the expression of gen-
eral policy, but lacks “any intent to create a cause of action or any judi-
cially enforceable individual rights.”130 Thus, “AIRFA requires federal 
agencies to consider, but not necessarily to defer to, Indian religious 
values.”131 
 There are several marked differences between the Western systems 
of belief and Native American spirituality. Whereas Western religions 
focus on existential questions about the meaning of life, Native Ameri-
can belief springs from the sanctity of nature.132 As such, Native Ameri-
can worship is inextricably linked to the use of certain lands, animals, 
and hallucinogenic plants. Native American worship is also manifested 
quite differently than its Western counterparts, in discrete and remote 
places and with no accepted canonical texts or universal truths.133 The 
contrast between Native American spirituality, on the one hand, and 
Western concepts of religion and public order, on the other, came to 
the fore in two Supreme Court decisions dealing with principal ele-
ments of Native American worship. 
 In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc. the Court exam-
ined a religious freedom challenge by Native Americans to a planned 
use of public land for economic and recreational purposes.134 Specifi-
cally, the Court reviewed whether the Free Exercise Clause was violated 
by building a road and harvesting timber in a forest traditionally used 
by Native Americans for religious worship.135 Although the Court rec-
ognized that the proposed plan would devastate Native American reli-
gious practices that were intimately and inextricably connected with the 
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130 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). 
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concerned land, the Court nevertheless concluded that the planned 
construction did not coerce Native Americans to act contrary to their 
religious beliefs.136 By holding that the government has no duty to ac-
commodate Native American religious practices, the Court endorsed 
the Anglo-American concept of land as property.137 In doing so, the 
decision effectively foreclosed the possibility of using the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment to protect Native American religious 
sites. 
 Subsequently, the Native American practice of using peyote for 
sacramental purposes came under the review of the Supreme Court in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.138 Smith in-
volved the denial of unemployment compensation to two Native Amer-
icans who were fired from their jobs as drug rehabilitators after they 
ingested peyote during a Native American religious ceremony.139 Prior 
to Smith, the long-established judicial approach to Free Exercise matters 
consisted of a balancing test which allowed laws to burden religion only 
when they were narrowly tailored to protect compelling governmental 
interests by the least restrictive means.140 Smith abruptly abandoned this 
strict scrutiny test by interpreting the Free Exercise Clause as permit-
ting a neutral law of general applicability to have incidental burdens on 
religious freedom.141 Under the Smith rule, the government is no long-
er required to make exceptions for religious practices or show a com-
pelling governmental interest to justify a neutral policy that indirectly 
burdens religious freedom.142 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice 
O’Connor held that even if the compelling state interest test was ap-
plied, the State interest of fighting the war on drugs would be suffi-
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ciently compelling to prohibit or regulate peyote use.143 Once more, 
the Court gave primacy to the proclaimed public interest over the Na-
tive American religious practice.144 
 The Court’s decision generated a backlash from religious groups, 
legislatures, and scholars who interpreted Smith as the abandonment of 
constitutional protection to free exercise.145 Congress responded with 
the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).146 
The RFRA was designed to restore the compelling governmental inter-
est test by codifying it as the statutory standard for evaluating Free Ex-
ercise concerns.147 Nevertheless, its actual contribution to religious 
freedom has proven malleable because either courts adopted a narrow 
interpretation for RFRA, or RFRA could not restore what was not judi-
cially protected under the compelling government interest test in the 
first place.148 In the context of Native Americans, this resulted in limit-
ing key elements of their religious practice. 
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III. Evaluating Law’s Role as a Primary Vehicle in  
Advancing Liberal Ideals 
 This Part cautiously evaluates Part II’s survey in terms of the basic 
quest within political liberalism to promote peaceful coexistence. This 
is a guarded attempt because, as previously noted, the above examples 
concerning minority religions discussed outcomes and rhetoric in a 
diverse group of liberal systems without accounting for their internal 
differences. Nevertheless, we trust that this analysis would benefit fur-
ther inquiry and discussion into the role that law could, should, and 
does play in contemporary multicultural tensions. 
 Amid growing diversification of the Western world, two rival re-
sponses within liberal political thought rose to prominence. These re-
sponses proposed competing notions as to the best mechanism for fa-
cilitating cultural diversity in modern democracies.149 The first 
response, liberal integrationism, advanced the vision of a common public 
identity.150 Although respecting differences as a private matter, integra-
tionists argued that the most promising basis for political stability is the 
homogenization of ethno-cultural difference in the public sphere.151 
Criticisms of this view suggested that integrationism disregarded de-
mands of diversity152 and camouflaged the continued dominance of the 
majority interests.153 These criticisms prompted the rise of a second 
approach to political diversity known as multicultural liberalism.154 This 
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view justified liberalism through the promotion of multiple identities 
and cultural rights, viewing the respect for cultural difference as essen-
tial to long-term social and political stability.155 
                                                                                                                     
 In its pursuit of social coexistence, liberalism mandated the pro-
tection of a series of fundamental rights and values including equality 
and the guarantees to freedoms of speech, association, and religion. 
Specifically, the liberal commitment to religious liberty stemmed 
from:156 (i) liberalism’s moral commitment to choice and personal au-
tonomy;157 and (ii) liberalism’s instrumentalist capacity, which envi-
sioned religion as a vehicle to advance desirable social ends.158 Consid-
ering the centrality of religious freedom in liberal thought, the legal 
balancing between religious freedom claims and other liberal values 
and interests could, in principle, have invoked greater accommodation 
for religious beliefs than the restrictive legal approach discussed in the 
previous section.159 
 One possible explanation for these unfavorable outcomes in con-
nection with minority religious practices may be attributed to liberal-
ism’s “built-in” commitment to secularism, which by its nature translates 
into a less responsive attitude toward religious practices.160 Religion pos-
es difficult challenges to liberal thought. In general, religions single out 
their version of the good life in an absolute manner, which often entails 
the exclusion of alternative worldviews. Many, if not all, religions also 
contain aspects of social control, restrictions on freedom of choice, ine-
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Bobs-Merrill Educational Publishing 1955) (1689) (“[T]he whole jurisdiction of the magis-
trate reaches only to those civil concernments. . . . [This cannot] be extended to men’s 
souls.”). But cf. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999) 
(including a variety of essays on the conflicts between religion and liberal thought, such as 
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quality, intolerance, and discrimination toward some of their members 
(such as women) and non-members (such as homosexuals).161 As such, 
religion potentially conflicts with key principles of liberal ideology— 
including liberty, autonomy, and equality—and potentially jeopardizes 
liberalism’s endeavor to sustain social and cultural neutrality. Religion 
also poses a challenge to liberal thought by offering possible antidotes 
to liberalism’s moral deficiencies and the inability of modern structures 
to overcome blights such as poverty, violence, and decadence.162 
 In view of these challenges, the entire spectrum of the liberal pa-
radigm, including multicultural liberalism, has maintained political se-
cularism as its philosophical foundation, and expected some level of 
assimilation by minority religious communities.163 Consequently, de-
marcations of religion-state boundaries have produced political regimes 
ranging from French laïcité to the U.S. model of normative non-
establishment, where the institutional relegation of religion to the pri-
vate sphere may have generated some level of unintended bias against 
religious minorities.164 
 Nevertheless, this explanation about the unfavorable legal out-
comes for religious minorities seems far from comprehensive. Apart 
from conceptual criticisms portraying liberalism as a power-driven doc-
trine as opposed to one seeking neutrality,165 this argument cannot ac-
count for the unresponsive attitudes prevalent in multicultural liberal 
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regimes like England and Germany, both of which regard religion as an 
integral part of the public sphere.166 Thus, a deeper look into the 
source of reluctance to apply more generous protection to religious 
minorities is necessary. Moreover, such an inquiry is further dictated by 
the principles of multicultural liberalism, which advances the protec-
tion of religious minorities as a principal liberal ideal.167 
 The balancing tests incorporated within existing legal frame-
works—such as RFRA’s “compelling governmental interest”168 or the 
“necessary in a democratic society” test reflected in international and 
European instruments169—provide a flexible interpretive margin for 
the process of balancing rights. As discussed above, both the principled 
approach to rights protection and legal pragmatism entrust—for dif-
ferent reasons—the judicial process to provide protection for minority 
interests by way of weighing competing values.170 This position was 
memorably articulated by Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnett, where he explained that “the very purpose of [the] 
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts.”171 Nevertheless, as is evident from the analysis of Native Ameri-
cans’ religious practices, their free exercise was predominantly pro-
tected in legislative acts of Congress, with RFRA as a primary example. 
In subsequent developments the Supreme Court continued to en-
croach on RFRA’s scope, ultimately declaring RFRA unconstitutional as 
applied to state and local governments for exceeding Congress’s au-
thority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.172 This legal 
exchange contributed to extensive debates in the United States over 
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the appropriate government branch to assume the responsibility for 
free exercise protection, with strong advocates on both sides.173 
 Nonetheless, the above survey on the treatment of minority relig-
ions in Europe takes the sting away from this philosophical debate. Ex-
amples concerning the treatment of NRMs and Muslims in the Euro-
pean public sphere demonstrate just how unresponsive and at times 
exclusionary the attitudes of both legislatures and judicial arms can turn 
out to be.174 An international legal approach may advocate the defeat of 
domestic biases by employing international and supranational human 
rights instruments. Nevertheless, the above analysis does not leave much 
doubt that supranational bodies have proved unhelpful in addressing 
the inadequacies of the domestic legal systems, exemplified by the 
ECtHR’s rulings on the Islamic headscarf and state monitoring of 
NRMs.175 Moreover, although the European framework protecting reli-
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gious minorities is much broader than the rulings by the ECtHR, the 
actual impact of existing European legislative instruments has been in-
effective because they lack enforcement mechanisms to follow-up on the 
non-binding recommendations produced by their monitoring bodies.176 
 Moreover, “[n]o society is as liberal as liberals would like [and] 
none fully realizes the principles and aspirations of liberalism.”177 Nev-
ertheless, the evidence suggests that religious minorities face an insur-
mountable challenge to guarantee their rights when their beliefs are 
perceived as challenging the socio-cultural mainstream within their 
states. In these situations, the law—whether legislative or judicially-
based—has been utilized time and again in a manner that is contrary to 
the liberal ideals of pluralism and coexistence. Observers of European 
politics note that “[r]eligion continues to lurk underneath the veneer 
of European secularization.”178 As illustrated above, Christian forces 
were pivotal in the campaign to monitor NRMs, generating mecha-
nisms that severely encroached on the rights of hundreds of religious 
groups where those groups were often much less harmful than their 
original portrayal.179 The widespread legislative European system of 
recognition cultivated and entrenched the supremacy of Christian Eu-
rope.180 The extreme Austrian system resulted in broad exclusion of 
religious latecomers.181 The lingering Christian supremacy was also evi-
dent in Ludin, which subsequently generated legislative exemptions for 
Judeo-Christian symbols from the ban on religious symbols in German 
schools.182 Finally, the legislative history of the French headscarf ban 
revealed the central role played by the Christian Right in propagating 
the threat of Islamic headscarves to France’s future.183 
 Nevertheless, Christian dominance within liberal societies is not 
the sole force generating challenges to religious liberty for religious 
                                                                                                                      
State interference with religious freedom than affirm and uphold the measures of protec-
tion that have been entrusted to it.”). 
176 See Lauren C. Baillie, Comment, Protection of Religious Minorities in Europe: The Coun-
cil of Europe’s Successes and Failures, 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev 617, 632 (2008). 
177 Stephen Holmes, The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought, in Liberalism And 
The Moral Life, supra note 1, at 227, 230. 
178 Peter J. Katzenstein, Multiple Modernities as Limits to Secular Europeanization?, in Re-
ligion in an Expanding Europe, supra note 65, at 1, 33. 
179 See Beckford, supra note 105, at 224, 263. 
180 See Casanova, supra note 65, at 65–67. 
181 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom: Austria, 
supra note 62. 
182 See Heinig, supra note 67, at 194–95. 
183 See Bowen, supra note 73, at 1--4; Scott, supra note 67, at 125--27; Roy, supra note 
77, at 1; Gunn, supra note 75, at 7. 
84 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:53 
minorities. Religious minorities plead for their rights before legislatures 
and judges who often come from fundamentally different religious and 
nonreligious backgrounds compared to that of the minority group, 
which impinges upon understanding and toleration. The case of Native 
Americans is particularly illustrative. In the early encounters between 
whites and Native Americans, the whites assumed that Native Ameri-
cans “knew no religion” because their spirituality was so fundamentally 
different compared to the prevailing Judeo-Christian tradition.184 
 But even if one remains skeptical that religio-cultural hegemonic 
thrust underpins the legal limitation of minorities’ religious liberty, and 
opts to explain the evidence by way of a sincere secular-neutral en-
deavor to protect competing liberal values, an important liberal aspect 
remains noticeably absent of such an explanation. Whereas reasoning 
offered by courts and legislatures for sanctioning infringements on mi-
norities’ religious liberty has been articulated in liberal terms, it is strik-
ing that the process has underemphasized religious freedom claims. In 
this instance, the example of Islamic dress is particularly illustrative: 
“when it comes to Islam, secular Europeans tend to reveal the limits 
and prejudices of modern secularist toleration.”185 Permissible limita-
tions on religious freedom were authorized in Dahlab on the basis of 
cultural neutrality.186 In Begum, such limitations were justified based on 
equality and autonomy.187 Similarly, the protection of secularism pro-
vided the liberal justification for the French statutory ban and for the 
ECtHR’s ruling in Sahin.188 Yet, these examples hardly paid lip service 
to the possibility that Islamic dress may be a true manifestation of a re-
ligious belief. Throughout these proceedings, the Muslim attire is “not 
understood as a religious symbol, but as a primarily political one . . . 
[thus] being taken as a source of danger.”189 
 Liberal states assign the public education system the role of incul-
cating liberal values.190 In principle, attributing this role to public 
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schools could have generated the exact opposite approach to that exer-
cised by European courts regarding Islamic attire. Instead of excluding 
Shabina Begum or Lucia Dahlab from school, permitting Islamic attire 
may have actually generated an inclusive atmosphere fostering tolerance 
and respect for others. In Dahlab, the judges seemed oblivious to this 
possibility and completely preoccupied by the threat of Islam to gender 
equality.191 In Begum the Lords seemed deeply impressed by the school’s 
willingness to allow a “light” Islamic option as part of its dress code, not-
withstanding the fact that this alternative should have been the natural 
development in an English school composed of a Muslim majority.192 
 Similarly, in the context of NRMs, discriminatory practices were 
justified as liberal states acting on their duty to protect desirable inter-
ests. Justified state’s duties were construed to impose prerequisites for 
registration of religious communities (Austrian Religious Communities 
Act),193 and also for the legal surveillance of religious movements sus-
pected to be dangerous, exemplified by the different monitoring agen-
cies operating in France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium.194 Yet these 
steps were repeatedly found to be unnecessarily extreme and dispro-
portionate.195 
Conclusion 
 Religious liberty, like any other fundamental right, is not absolute. 
Situations may arise where the manifestation of religious belief should 
give way to the protection of other rights or public interests.196 Never-
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theless, the surveyed data suggests that an unreceptive social climate 
resulting from a perceived threat to the dominant culture—whether 
motivated by a lingering hegemonic religion or by illiberal narratives— 
can and does utilize liberal categories and discourse as justifications for 
legal barriers to the manifestation of minorities’ religious beliefs. 
 The opportunity for manipulation casts a shadow on the pro-
claimed neutrality of legal means and should be accounted for in cur-
rent liberal deliberations. Debates between legal pragmatists and the 
Dworkinian approach, as well as those between constitutionalists and 
democratic theorists, should address these limitations in a model that 
assigns the primary role of conflict resolution to the law. Notably, Pro-
fessor Rosenberg has constructed an empirical argument against the 
ability of courts to generate change without the support of the larger 
political system.197 But this Article suggests an additional dimension for 
this line of criticism. As long as unpopular religious minorities are pre-
sumed threatening to the dominant cultural mainstream, they remain 
external to the arena of legal possibilities. As outsiders, they are often 
barred from obtaining judicial protection and the support of the great-
er political system. 
 Considering the failure by the above formal and doctrinal ap-
proaches to focus on the law’s ability to mask illiberal attitudes, legal 
discourse is left with the CLS’s position on the law’s inherent subjectiv-
ity, alongside those critiquing CLS discourse as unable to provide an 
alternative political vision for a just society.198 Multicultural liberalism 
currently represents the preferred approach to social and cultural di-
versity.199 Nevertheless, the surveyed data reveals the limitations of this 
theory in its treatment of religious minorities within liberal societies. In 
effect, multicultural liberalism failed precisely where it attempted to 
rectify integrationist incarnations of liberal ideas, namely in offering a 
viable alternative to situations where minority practices should be pro-
tected against a majority’s encroachment because of the minority’s in-
trinsic vulnerability. In the end, the assimilationist thrust seems to re-
main quite viable even among Western democracies.200 
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 A legal realist approach may choose to recommend an executive 
and administrative approach for facilitating social conflicts. This ap-
proach places the protection of minorities in the hands of local gov-
ernmental agencies that may be better acquainted with the religions of 
their locale.201 Recently, this possibility resurfaced in Quebec, Canada, 
in the recommendations by the Consultation Commission on Accom-
modation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, known also as the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission.202 This Commission favored the “citizen 
route,” defined as “less formal and relies on negotiation and the search 
for a compromise” over the legal route to resolving conflicts, which “ul-
timately decree[s] a winner and a loser.”203 Notwithstanding its promise 
of dejudicialization for Quebec, this model seems to raise several chal-
lenges for a more universal implementation. A clear trend characterizes 
the politics of contemporary democracies, where those who feel injus-
tice systematically turn to judicial proceedings as their preferred me-
chanism for effectuating change.204 It is unclear how this trend could 
be reversed, particularly in societies replete with cultural conflicts more 
intense than those in the Canadian context.205 Moreover, the flexibility 
offered by an executive-based arrangement also entails a disadvantage 
because such arrangements often culminate in a more ad-hoc protec-
tion than the documented, prescriptive, and generally applicable guar-
antees offered via legal standards. “Belonging,” it has been noted, “is 
about full acceptance and feeling at home.”206 Thus, the formality pre-
sented by legal measures remains an important element of recognition 
and accommodation, evident in the experience of religious minorities 
within Western democracies.207 
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 For those envisioning law as the watchdog of social, political, and 
economic abuses, its failure as liberalism’s main vehicle in promoting 
neutrality among competing worldviews is understandably frustrating. 
Nevertheless, a legal resolution to conflicts seems to offer practical ad-
vantages. As Professor Hampshire has argued, “[a]lmost every organ-
ized society requires an institution and also a procedure for adjudicat-
ing between conflicting moral claims.”208 Legal scholarship has 
highlighted the role of legal devices as strategies enabling coexistence, 
noting federalism, burden of proof, trial by jury, and the public/private 
divide as helpful strategies to manage and defuse cultural tensions.209 
The analysis above revealed the preference among the politically pow-
erful for legal resolutions to cultural conflicts because legal resolutions 
enable creative strategies and orderly procedures by which the power-
ful can impose their dominant views while dressed in liberal rhetoric. 
 Nevertheless, the lure of the law seems to hold for weaker sections 
of society as well, particularly in the context of enduring cultural ten-
sions. A political interest institutionalized as a binding law provides un-
paralleled opportunities for social conformity because the political in-
terest immediately becomes authoritative and enforceable. When the 
struggle over the public sphere is perpetual, as is generally the case with 
religion-based conflicts, legal measures are particularly appealing as 
opportunities for the opposing parties to mold the public sphere in 
accordance with their political and moral preferences.210 
 Nonetheless, because law enshrines political preferences, it re-
mains authoritative pending shifts in the distribution of political power. 
Therefore, weak social actors retain the prospects of changing legal ar-
rangements by way of demographic growth, creative legal or political 
maneuvering, or any other enabling adjustment to the distribution of 
political power. The wider scope of religious freedom enjoyed by U.S.-
based NRMs compared with their European counterparts is due to 
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U.S.-based NRMs’ successful recruitment of powerful players within the 
U.S. legal and political system.211 Prior to involving “friends in high 
places,” U.S.-based NRMs usually lost their legal battles. Nevertheless, 
once key organizations—such as the ACLU—and scholars studying 
NRMs joined their cause, NRMs experienced greater responsiveness by 
the U.S. legal system. This produced a dramatic broadening of their 
religious liberty guarantees compared to European-based NRMs. 
 Enduring cultural conflicts amplify law’s political character. In 
these contexts legal arrangements seem no more than temporary mo-
dus vivendi that reshuffle once shifts in political power are ripe. Never-
theless, law’s political nature does not seem to counteract its ability to 
facilitate cultural conflicts. Heraclitus of Ephesus famously coined the 
phrase “nothing is permanent except change.” The true appeal of law 
is being unveiled by our infinitely expanding universe of social and cul-
tural conflicts: these conflicts give the impression that changing unfa-
vorable legal arrangements in liberal societies always remains within a 
feasible reach. 
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